Access control is the measure that appears most often as a cause in security incidents, usually not because it was absent but because it was never brought up to date over the years. It consists of three parts that only work together: a rule, its technical enforcement, and evidence that it was observed.
Zutritt, Zugang, Zugriff
German professional usage distinguishes three levels that English collapses into the single term access control. The three-way split comes from the annex to the former Bundesdatenschutzgesetz; the GDPR did not carry it over, but it remains in common use in German practice and travels well in audits. Anyone dealing with German auditors will meet all three words.
| Level | Protects against | Typical controls |
|---|---|---|
| Zutrittskontrolle (physical entry) | unauthorised entry to rooms and buildings | locking systems, badge readers, visitor rules, security zones |
| Zugangskontrolle (system access) | unauthorised use of systems | authentication, multi-factor methods, screen lock, network segmentation |
| Zugriffskontrolle (data access) | unauthorised reading, alteration or deletion of data | role and entitlement concept, tenant separation, logging |
The distinction is more than terminology. An attacker who defeats system access meets data access as a second layer, provided it has been differentiated at all. Where every signed-in user can see everything, one account brings down the entire estate.
Models
| Model | Principle | Suited to |
|---|---|---|
| DAC | the owner of an object grants rights themselves | small environments, file shares; hard to evidence |
| MAC | centrally imposed rules that users cannot change | high confidentiality requirements, self-contained environments |
| RBAC | rights attach to roles, users are assigned to roles | the standard in enterprise applications |
| ABAC | decisions based on attributes: user, object, context, time | dynamic and cloud environments, fine-grained rules |
RBAC dominates today, supplemented by attribute-based conditions for context such as location, device state or time of day. More important than the choice of model is that roles are derived from tasks and not from what individuals have historically accumulated.
From rule to implementation
A sound approach runs to five steps: set the access rules in a policy, derive roles from business processes, establish a governed procedure for requesting and approving access, enforce the rights technically, and review what has been granted at regular intervals. The last step decides effectiveness: the other four can be done once, this one cannot.
Enforcement includes logging. Without a record of successful and rejected access to data that needs protection, neither can an incident be investigated nor can the effectiveness of the rule be evidenced. Logs themselves have to be access-protected and must not be alterable by the people being monitored.
Regulatory context
Art. 32 GDPR requires a level of protection appropriate to the risk; restricting access to what is necessary is one of the standard measures for that, and supervisory authorities ask about it routinely. ISO/IEC 27002 treats access control as a topic area of its own, with implementation guidance running from the access control policy through the management of privileged rights to secure log-on.
Typical weak points
- Shared accounts whose actions cannot be attributed to a person
- Administrative rights in the account used for everyday work
- Rights added on a move between departments but never withdrawn
- Far-reaching entitlements in test systems that hold production data
- Service and interface accounts with no owner and no expiry date
How Rizzqo ties access rules to the system
An access rule does not apply to a company; it applies to a system. In Rizzqo the dispatch follows from that: once an asset is assigned a category and subcategory, the requirements held for that classification appear against it, among them the access control requirements from ISO/IEC 27002. Reclassify a system and its requirement list adjusts, with newly applicable requirements added and no-longer-applicable ones removed.
Each requirement is answered by the asset's owner, with a reason and evidence held on the object, a role concept or the outcome of a recertification for instance. Judging appropriateness rests on the inherited protection need: a system inherits it from the primary assets it carries, so the strictness of the rule is measured against what actually hangs on it.