Information Security Objectives

Information security objectives are the intentions an organisation sets for what its ISMS is to achieve. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 requires them in clause 6.2 at the relevant functions and levels, derived from the policy and with planning of who achieves what by when. They are distinct from metrics and measures.

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What are information security objectives?

Information security objectives set out what state an ISMS is to reach within a given period, which makes its effectiveness testable. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 covers them in clause 6.2, together with the planning of how to achieve them. The BSI mapping table maps clause 6.2 to BSI-Standard 200-2, chapter 3. The objectives derive from the information security policy.

How objectives fit into building an ISMS is covered in the guide to ISMS implementation.

What does ISO 27001 clause 6.2 require?

Clause 6.2 covers two things: the objectives themselves and the planning of how to achieve them. Its core text comes from the harmonized structure that ISO sets for management system standards. In an audit, an auditor looks mainly at three points:

  • Each objective can be traced back to the policy and applies to named functions or levels.
  • Each objective has a plan for reaching it and for evaluating whether it was reached.
  • The objectives are documented, known to the people involved and up to date.

Objective, metric, measure: three levels

An objective describes a state, a metric measures it, a measure brings it about. The table shows the split using one example:

LevelQuestionExample
ObjectiveWhat state is to be reached?Critical systems can be restored within the agreed recovery time
MetricHow is it measured?Share of critical systems with a successfully tested restore
MeasureWhat is done to get there?Restore tests per system, fixing the findings, retest

Without this split, two faulty forms appear. The first is an objective that is actually a measure ("introduce a SIEM"); the second is a metric with no target state ("number of incidents").

Where should information security objectives come from?

Information security objectives should have an origin that can be named in an audit. Four sources qualify:

  • the risk treatment plan, because the significant risks set the priorities;
  • requirements of interested parties, such as contractually committed recovery times;
  • findings from internal audits, incidents and exercises;
  • projects with a security dimension, such as a cloud migration.

An objective that cannot be traced to any of these sources does not belong on the list.

Three examples with a traceable origin

Objective (example)OriginMeasure of success
Privileged access is personal and traceableFinding from the internal auditShare of privileged accounts without shared use
Security-relevant vulnerabilities are handled within set deadlines by severityResult of risk treatmentTime to remediation per severity
New staff know the reporting route and the policy from day oneIncident with an organisational causeShare of joiners briefed before system access

Target and baseline values are left out on purpose. They are specific to each organisation and have to be derived from its own requirements and risks.

Measurable if practicable: baseline, target, date

Under the core text, measurability applies only where it is practicable. Where no number fits, achievement can also be established through a maturity statement or the result of an exercise.

Where a number is chosen, three values belong with it: baseline, target and date. Without a baseline, nobody can decide at the end of the period whether the objective was met.

How are objectives cascaded across functions and levels?

The duty to set objectives at relevant functions and levels calls for a cascade. Objectives at management system level lead to derived contributions from the areas that actually deliver, such as IT operations, development, HR and procurement. A cascade that hands every area the same objective creates effort without steering anything.

Communicating does not mean publishing. Whoever is to contribute to an objective has to know their contribution. An auditor may ask someone responsible in IT operations which objective concerns their area and how its achievement is measured.

Four shortcomings that lead to audit findings

Findings arise where a requirement of clause 6.2 is not met:

  • Objectives have stayed the same for years although they have been met or become irrelevant (updating).
  • An objective has no plan, or its plan is never evaluated (planning).
  • The people involved cannot name the objectives for their area (communication).
  • Achievement is reported but not evaluated (monitoring).

The evaluation itself belongs in the management review, in which top management decides whether the ISMS is still fit for purpose and working.

How Rizzqo backs objectives with computed values

Rizzqo computes coverage per asset, per asset category and per framework from the finalised requirement answers. An objective such as "by year end, all cloud services are fully covered against the ISO 27001 requirements" then has a measure. It is the share of fully covered assets in that category. The value comes out of the work itself rather than being maintained by hand.

A daily snapshot records these values, so achievement can be shown over months. Open requirements appear with their responsible owner, and the measures for a missed objective can be derived from them directly.

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